Publication - Negotiation Over Decommitment Penalty

Authors: An, Bo; Lesser, Victor
Title: Negotiation Over Decommitment Penalty
Abstract: We consider the role of negotiation in deciding decommitment penalties. In our model, agents simultaneously negotiate over both the contract price and decommitment penalty in the contracting game and then decide whether to decommit from contracts in the decommitment game. Experimental results show that setting penalties through negotiation achieved higher social welfare than other exogenous penalty setting mechanisms.
Publication: UMASS Department of Computer Science Technical Report 2011-009
Location: Amherst, MA
Date: 2011
Sources: PDF: /Documents/BoAn_TR2011-009.pdf
Reference: An, Bo; Lesser, Victor. Negotiation Over Decommitment Penalty. UMASS Department of Computer Science Technical Report 2011-009. 2011.
bibtex: 
@techreport{An-498,
  author    = "Bo An and Victor Lesser",
  title     = "{Negotiation Over Decommitment Penalty}",
  year      = "2011",
  address   = "Amherst, MA",
  url       = "http://mas.cs.umass.edu/paper/498",
}