Publication - Negotiation Over Decommitment Penalty

Authors: An, Bo; Lesser, Victor
Title: Negotiation Over Decommitment Penalty
Abstract: We consider the role of negotiation in deciding decommitment penalties. In our model, agents simultaneously negotiate over both the contract price and decommitment penalty in the contracting game and then decide whether to decommit from contracts in the decommitment game. Experimental results show that setting penalties through negotiation achieved higher social welfare than other exogenous penalty setting mechanisms.
Keywords: Distributed AI, Multi-Agent Systems, Negotiation
Publication: Proc. of 10th Intl. Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-2011); Extended Abstract, pp. 1101 - 1102
Editor: Tumer, Yolum, Sonenberg & Stone
Location: Taipei, Taiwan
Publisher: IFAAMAS
Date: 2011
Sources: PDF: /Documents/bo-an_aamas11b.pdf
Reference: An, Bo; Lesser, Victor. Negotiation Over Decommitment Penalty. Proc. of 10th Intl. Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-2011); Extended Abstract, Tumer, Yolum, Sonenberg & Stone, ed., IFAAMAS, pp. 1101-1102. 2011.
bibtex: 
@inproceedings{An-497,
  author    = "Bo An and Victor Lesser",
  title     = "{Negotiation Over Decommitment Penalty}",
  booktitle = "Proc. of 10th Intl. Conf. on Autonomous Agents and
               Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-2011); Extended Abstract",
  editor    = "Yolum Tumer and Sonenberg \& Stone",
  publisher = "IFAAMAS",
  pages     = "1101-1102",
  year      = "2011",
  address   = "Taipei, Taiwan",
  url       = "http://mas.cs.umass.edu/paper/497",
}