Publication - Bilateral Bargaining with One-sided Two-type Uncertainty

Authors: An, Bo; Gatti, Nicola; Lesser, Victor
Title: Bilateral Bargaining with One-sided Two-type Uncertainty
Abstract: It is a challenging problem to find agents’ rational strategies in bargaining with incomplete information. In this paper we perform a game theoretic analysis of agents’ rational strategies in finite horizon bilateral bargaining with one-sided uncertainty regarding agents’ reserve prices. The negotiation setting considered in this paper has four features: alternating-offers bargaining protocol, finite horizon, two-type uncertainty about agents’ reserve prices, and discount factors. The main contribution of this paper is the development of a novel algorithm to find a pure strategy sequential equilibrium in the setting we study. Our algorithm is based on the combination of game theoretic analysis and search techniques which finds agents’ equilibrium in pure strategies when they exist.
Keywords: Negotiation
Publication: Proceedings of 2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology, Vol: 2, pp. 403 - 410
Publisher: IEEE Computer Society
Date: 2009
Sources: PDF: http://mas.cs.umass.edu/~ban/papers/uncertain_reserve_prices_iat.pdf
Reference: An, Bo; Gatti, Nicola; Lesser, Victor. Bilateral Bargaining with One-sided Two-type Uncertainty. Proceedings of 2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology, Volume 2, IEEE Computer Society, pp. 403-410. 2009.
bibtex: 
@article{An-475,
  author    = "Bo An and Nicola Gatti and Victor Lesser",
  title     = "{Bilateral Bargaining with One-sided Two-type
               Uncertainty}",
  journal   = "Proceedings of 2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM International
               Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent
               Agent Technology",
  volume    = "2",
  publisher = "IEEE Computer Society",
  pages     = "403-410",
  year      = "2009",
  url       = "http://mas.cs.umass.edu/paper/475",
}